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Abstract Firms often complain about the implementation of new regulations. Many
regulations are perceived as an additional cost for no business value. This paper reviews
the perceptions by the US and EU port and terminal managers of the business value
port security regulation compliance gives their organization. Resource-based strategic
theory is used as a framework for gauging these perceptions of value through the
administration of a survey to all EU and US port and terminal operators on their
security compliance with Bbest practices.^ Although some managers perceive that a
variety of security assets under their control are very important to their business value,
most agree that it is the way security assets are deployed or the right combination of
assets that is perceived to add the value. The right combination of assets, capabilities,
and competencies are perceived to give an organization-enhanced value if the combi-
nation is valuable, rare, inimitable, and/or not easily substitutable (VRIN).
Keywords Port security regulation . Perceived business value
1 Introduction
Regulations have an impact on the strategies firms use (Rugman et al 1999; Bonardi
et al 2005). An organization’s strategy for compliance with regulation includes not only
the plan of action but also how the plan is executed and implemented (Barney 1991).
Furthermore, strategies have a direct impact on firm performance or firm value in a
variety of contexts such as human resources, stockholder engagement, logistics, and
diversification (Youndt et al 1996; Hill and Snell 1988; Lynch et al 2000; Gomez‐Mejia
1992).
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As of 2004, maritime firms and the ports they use are required to implement the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) security regulations. This
code allows some freedom in the way firms and ports implement the regulations. We
ask whether the security regulation compliance strategy adopted by the ports and
terminal operators impacts how managers perceive how business value is enhanced
by their deployment of security resources in their own ports.
Measurement of port value is difficult because firms choose ports based on a variety
of factors. Factors include, but are not limited to, port location, efficiency, hinterland
infrastructure, and fees (Slack 1985; Wiegmans et al 2008). Actual port security has not
been found to impact port choice unless security compliance leads to port charges
(Tongzon and Sawant 2007). Port choice can be used as a proxy for business value of
the port (Slack 1985).
Business value and competitiveness, however, can be decreased if compliance with
regulation does not occur or does not occur in a fashion that is considered legitimate for
the industry (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Under this theory, known as Institutional
theory, the loss in business value is due to a loss of legitimacy. Therefore, if managers
perceive value to their port from security assets, capabilities, and competencies, they
will believe their ports to be legitimate in the eyes of the public and the industry, and
thus they will perceive business value is impacted positively.
However, we use resource-based strategic theory as a framework to test the question
whether the deployment of security resources in a port is perceived by the port’s
management as adding value. This theory purports that the right combination of
resources, which include assets, capabilities, and competencies, can give a firm a better
value if the combination of these resources is valuable, rare, inimitable, and/or not
easily substitutable (VRIN). A survey is used to determine whether the managers
perceive that their port security resources are BVRIN.^
Perceptions of value are used rather than evaluating each port’s actual security
practices due to the nature and secrecy of each port’s security. Managers are willing
to share their perceptions on the deployment of assets rather than disclosing actual
deployment for obvious reasons. Furthermore, perceptions by managers of the value of
their strategic decisions impacts the actual decisions they make with regard to the
organization’s strategy planned and implemented (Smircich and Stubbart 1985).
2 Resource-based strategic theory and the type of resources
To explain the benefits of Resource-Based Strategic Theory to the application of a
port’s security strategy, we begin by paraphrasing Grant (1991). BOrganizations take
strategic actions to preserve and sustain strengths, offset weaknesses, avert or mitigate
threats and capitalize on opportunities. Strategy is balance between the external
environment demands on the organization and its internal capabilities. Strategic man-
agement models traditionally have defined an organization’s strategy in terms of its
product/service provided and the market served. Resource based theory of strategy
prescribes that the strategic position of the organization is based on the resources,
capabilities and competencies rather than on the services/products derived from those
capabilities. Resources and capabilities, especially organizational skills and practices
learned over time, can become unique to a particular organization and hard to imitate
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by others. Competitive advantage [or organizational value] is based on the resources
and capabilities, therefore, is potentially much more sustainable than that based on
product/service and market positioning. The organization’s resources and capabilities
can be thought of as a platform from which the organization derives various services/
products for various markets. Leveraging the organization’s capabilities across markets
and services/products, rather than targeting specific services/products for specific
markets, becomes the strategic driver. Products/services and markets may come and
go, but the organization’s capabilities are more enduring. Therefore, creating strategy
based on unique resources and capabilities provides a more long-term view of strategy
than the traditional approach, and one more robust in today’s uncertain and dynamic
competitive environment.^
Determining competitiveness or business value for ports is difficult as Bbeing
competitive^ defined in most strategy theories often implies an evaluation of compet-
itors’ and customers’ reactions to decisions made by the organization. Because port
security decisions have an element of compliance with regulation, competitors’ or
customers’ reactions to port security decisions may not be the best method for port
managers making those decision to determine whether value to the port has occurred.
Resource-based strategic theory can be used to evaluate port strategy with regard to
port security decisions because the theory focuses on security resources, capabilities,
and competencies rather than a security service observed by competitors or customers
provided by the port. This internal focus on the port can help overcome the sensitive
nature of examining security service where comparing specific security services across
ports may compromise the very security those services hope to provide. Port
security decisions like other strategy decisions involve commitment to resources
and development of capabilities and competencies. Once the port has developed
and invested in the mix of security resources and capabilities, the port has a
potentially sustainable advantage as the mix is developed over time, becomes
part of the organization’s procedures and may be unique to the port itself.
Further, as the mix is embedded in the port’s procedures and operations, it
provides a long-term strategy responsive to the dynamic environment in which
the port operates.
Because the resource-based strategic theory views the organization as a historically
determined collection of assets or resources which are tied Bsemi-permanently^ to the
organization, the dynamic resources (capabilities or competencies) may generate addi-
tional opportunities over time (Collis 1994; Teece et al 1997). These dynamic resources
become specific to the organization and are not easily imitated by rivals (Barney 1991).
This is the source of competitive advantage or value to the organization. Because each
organization’s resource bundle is unique, being a consequence of it past managerial
decisions and subsequent organizational experience, it follows that so is each organi-
zation’s opportunity set (Lockett et al 2009). The assumptions here are path dependence
and organizational heterogeneity (Lockett 2005) because resources committed are
difficult to change and capabilities such as learning achieved are different from other
organizations due to the experience of the organization. Furthermore, organizational
heterogeneity exists for ports as no two ports are exactly alike. And, for port organi-
zations, the mix of port security resources and capabilities can be a value to the
organization because of the uniqueness of managerial decisions and subsequent
experiences.
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Employing the resource as the unit of analysis, the resource-based strategic theory
evaluates the extent to which an organization may be able to sustain a position of
competitive advantage or organizational value (Lockett et al 2009). According to
Barney (1991), an advantage is sustainable if the resources/mix must have the follow-
ing attributes (VRIN): V—It must be valuable. Value allows opportunities to be
exploited and threats neutralized. R—It must be rare. Rare are resources that are limited
and not equally distributed across the organization’s current and potential competitors.
I—It must be inimitable. Inimitability refers to the difficulty of replication by other
organizations. And N—It must be non-substitutable. Non-substitutability implies that a
resource cannot be simply replaced. Again, the resource mix must be evaluated in light
of the definition of VRIN to determine sustainability of the competitive advantage or
value of the organization.
Is each opportunity set, in fact, unique if similar decisions are made as a result of
regulation such as port security regulations? Resource-based strategic theory can be used to
provide a context for determining whether port operators perceive their stock of resources
and decisions on capabilities and competencies for port security make a difference to the
port’s business value. In this paper, we evaluate the perception of port and terminal
managers on their organizations’ value by the way they deploy and bundle of port security
assets, capabilities, competencies, and management of these resources. We ask them
whether they perceive their mix of port security resources, capabilities, and competencies
VRIN and thus, have sustainable value to the organization (or competitive advantage).
Barney (1991) also proposes that resources enable firms to conceive of and imple-
ment strategies that improve their efficiency and their effectiveness and thus, the firm’s
value. Efficiency and effectiveness are key to sustainable port operations. Sirmon et al.
(2008) adds that resources are instrumental to value but add that management must
effectively bundle and deploy an organization’s resources. So how resources are
bundled, managed, and deployed is an important factor to business value and compet-
itiveness. Port managers evaluating how port security resources are bundled, managed,
and deployed can give insight to how port security compliance is perceived to give
value, if any, to port operations.
Resource-based strategic theory has been applied in the maritime research literature.
Chou and Chang (2004) used resource-based strategic theory to evaluate the Taiwan
shipbuilding industry. This paper reviews the entire Taiwan shipbuilding industry rather
than a particular firm. The researchers recommended strategic decisions to change as a
result of identifying the core competencies in production management. Furthermore,
the authors recommend a change in direction of government policy to enhance the
industry. However, this paper mixes resource-based theory with other strategy theories
such as Porter (1980) by not only assessing resources, competencies, and capabilities
but focusing on various products and markets. The significance of the paper to the
research conducted here is the acknowledgement that government policy (such as
security regulations) under resource-based strategic theory has an impact on the
business value/competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry.
Gordon et al. (2005) explain and interpret the contribution of technology to the Port
of Singapore using resource-based strategic theory. In this study, they argue that
resources that contribute to VRIN to create competitive advantage and value include
government policies, ample investment, and well thought out operations and technol-
ogy along with unique location and natural deep harbor. Furthermore, they note that
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lack of resources such as small land area can be overcome with the right mix of other
resources that add value such as information technology. The significance of this paper
to the current study is again the inclusion of government policies adding the deploy-
ment of operations as resources which are VRIN. Thus, the compliance with a
regulation such as port security and the deployment of the security resource mix into
operations can be VRIN and create business value.
The final Bmaritime-type^ study using resource-based strategic theory is by Pringle
and Kroll (1997) who evaluated the British naval fleet in light of the theory in the Battle
of Trafalgar. The study reveals that despite overwhelming superiority in the number and
construction of ships in Napoleon’s forces, the British sustained victory at Trafalgar due
to the way the ships and sailors were deployed. The study shows that competencies and
capabilities such as seafaring heritage, a winning tradition, and superlative leadership
were VRIN. The significance of this study to our study is that it recognizes the
limitations of physical resources alone and focuses on the importance of intangible
assets to provide organizational value. Again, intangible port security resources such as
capabilities in a port are critical to gaining advantage and value.
The above discussion shows that resource-based strategic theory can be applied to
the evaluation of the mix of port security resources. Since the theory prescribes that the
strategic position of the organization is based on the resources, capabilities, and
competencies rather than on the services/products derived from those capabilities,
management of the port can provide their insight on the VRIN of the port security
resources, and it follows that the strategic position or the value of the organization in
the industry can be evaluated. Using this theoretical framework allows us to understand
the security compliance value in a port without external parties’ involvement which
may cause a breach in the very security that is deployed.
3 ISPS requirements
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) is a comprehensive set of
measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to
the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the
USA (IMO 2003). The Code to which the USA and the EU subscribe is an amendment
to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, and it does not specify which specific
measures a particular port must take but instead outlines Ba standardized, consistent
framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset changes in threat with
changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities^ (IMO 2003).
Port facility security should cause minimum interference to shipping. At a minimum,
the port facilities must control access to the port facilities; monitor the port facilities
including anchoring and berthing; monitor restricted areas to ensure that only autho-
rized persons have access; supervise the handling of cargo; supervise the handling of
ship’s stores; ensure that security communication is readily available; and have a port
facilities security plan and a port facilities security officer. The port facilities plan must
include measures to prevent weapons and unauthorized access to the port; procedures
for responding to security threats, breaches and instructions from government; proce-
dures for evacuation and interfacing with ship security activities; procedures for
reviewing and updating the plan; procedures for reporting security incidents; measures
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to ensure effective security of cargo and cargo handling equipment; procedures for
responding to a security alert; and procedures for facilitating shore leave for ship
personnel and access to the ship by appropriate persons (IMO 2003). The port facility
officer is the responsible person for these activities and his/her duties include develop-
ing and maintaining the port facility plan; undertaking regular security inspections of
the port facility; recommending and incorporating modifications to the port security
plan; enhancing security awareness and vigilance by the port facility personnel;
reporting to relevant authorities and maintaining records of occurrences which threaten
the security of the port facility; coordinating with security services; ensuring that the
standards for security personnel are met; and ensuring that security equipment is
properly maintained and assisting ship security officers in confirming identity of those
seeking to board a ship (IMO 2003).
4 Security resources
As stated above, resource-based strategic theory defines resources as assets, capabili-
ties, competencies and the management of these resources. To determine, security
resources in a port we review the US Coast Guard (USCG) port security best practices.
We chose to use the USCG’s best practices because they apply in the US and many EU
ports have engaged the USCG as a consultant on port security (Sawyer 2011).
We categorize security assets/resources consistent with previous research on
resource-based strategic theory as physical, ongoing management, planning and struc-
turing management, human, technological, intangible, and financial (Chou and Chang
2004). Using the USCG list of best practices (USCG 2005), physical resources are
defined as physical structures, perimeter barriers, lighting, screening and detection
devices, towers, fencing, turnstiles, anti-vehicle barricades, and uniforms. Ongoing
management resources are communication systems, documentation and security reports
systems, patrolling systems, access systems, cargo tracking systems, security and access
procedures, security incentive systems, warning and alarm systems, and checklists.
Planning and structuring management resources include security-planning systems,
assessment systems, dual usage asset plans, brainstorming session system and security
logistics design. Human resources include employee knowledge, employee experience,
employee training systems, guard forces, trained canine units, drills, and exercises.
Technological resources include biometrics, software protection, electronic access con-
trol, electronic surveillance, electronic and automatic tracking, and enterprise resource
planning systems (ERP). Intangible assets are location of security assets, secure capac-
ity, complementary infrastructure, third-party security contracts, relationships with local
fisherman, a safety culture, union relationships, and outreach relationships. Finally,
financial resources are defined as port security fees, other revenue generation for
security and safety and cost savings from security compliance (USCG 2005).
5 Methodologies and design of the study
As stated above, perceptions of value are used rather than evaluating each port’s actual
security practices due to the nature and secrecy of each port’s security. In order to
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collect information on the perception port and terminal managers about the BVRIN^ of
their security resources, capabilities, and competencies, we administer a survey instru-
ment to all ports and terminal operators in EU ports and US ports. We study the EU and
US ports as their represent similarity in economic development and economic level.
Furthermore, management styles in the EU and the US tend to be similar (van Velsor
and Leslie 1995) and perceptions tend to be similar (Hofstede 1980; Weber and Hsee
1998). Future studies will be required to expand to Asia and other continents. Since we
are trying to measure how managers perceive the BVRIN^ of the security assets
deployed in their ports, we ask questions that indicate where the assets belong in the
categories of VRIN. The questions asked must be embedded within the theory to have
both reliability and validity (Fowler 1993). This simple method of collecting data is
develop from comments from industry members in the pilot sample described below.
They indicate that a simple categorization would provide the highest response rate.
The issues related to this type of data collection methodology include three con-
cerns. The first concern is the need to have confidence in the information collected and
that the information collected is not biased. The second concern is that the information
measured across all respondents is consistent and comparable, i.e., reliable. And, the
final concern is that the data collected under this method is consistent with other non-
survey-based data sources or valid (Fowler 1993).
In order to ensure that these concerns are addressed, we conduct the surveys in the
following manner. First, we determine the population to interview. Second, we design
the questions and determined the reliability and validity of the questions across the
interviewees. Third, we calculate the response rate and composition of the survey
respondents to determine whether the rate led to a conclusion with bias. Finally, we
comply with the rules on human subjects under the 1981 US policy for the Protection
of Human Subjects (Title 45, Part 46) which means that the survey was voluntary and
confidential.
The entire population of US and EU port managers and terminal operators is
surveyed. A list of addresses and email addresses is obtained from the 2011–2012
IHS Fairplay Ports and Terminals Guide (IHS Fairplay 2011). IHS Fairplay makes
every effort to ensure quality, accuracy and completeness of the information in this
Guide. This guide contains contact information by port, both for port authority man-
agers and terminal operators. Therefore, due to the fact that the entire population is in
the survey population there is no bias due to the frame selection of the population for
survey (Fowler 1993).
The survey questions are developed from various stakeholder input. The stake-
holders include port authority managers, terminal operators, consultants, Baltic and
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) officers, USCG operation officers, NATO
officers, European industry journalists and academic experts on port security, and on
resource-based strategic theory. Questions are developed to determine which security
resources owned and deployed by the respondent are considered to contribute to
business value of his/her port or terminal organization.
The port managers and the terminal operators receive the survey questions (See
Appendix 1) either via email or letter mail. The survey instrument is sent to the EU in
English, Spanish, and French so the respondent could choose in which language to
respond to the survey. These languages are chosen due to the ISPS requirement that
port operators have some designated personnel that can communicate in either English,
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Spanish, or French. The survey instrument is sent to the entire population of port
authority managers and terminal operators both in the EU and the USA. Recipients
with bad e-mail addresses are contacted via letter mail. Second requests are made of
non-respondents via email, mail and telephone (if information is available).
The total number of EU ports surveyed (surveys sent) is 1068 in the 22 countries in
the EU with a coastline. Responses received represent 21 countries—all EU countries
with ports except Portugal. The total number of US ports surveyed (surveys sent) is 176
in 22 states. The responses received represent 10 of 22 coastal states with all three
seacoasts and Alaska and Hawaii represented. Data collected in qualitative research
such as evaluation of responses from the same port allows aggregation if they responses
are similar (Miller 1986) which is what is done. Similar responses are an indicator that
reliability is present in the questions because consistent measures are received in
comparable situations (same port). Furthermore, since terminal operators may have
operations in multiple ports, the finding of similar responses in the same port also
indicates reliability in understanding the theory definitions of VRIN across stakeholders
across ports. (See below for statistical analysis of reliability and validity).
We conclude that this methodology of collection of survey responses for all respon-
dents does not bias the responses except for Portugal. Entire populations are surveyed
causing no sampling bias. The letters are consistent to each respondent causing no
survey interviewing bias.
Failure to collect data from a high percentage can create a bias in the information
collected (Fowler 1993). Those who do not respond may represent a systematically
different group from those who responded. There is no statistical test to evaluate bias of
survey responses. However, non-response if it is systematic may create bias. Therefore,
the higher the response rate the more likely the non-responses are not systematic but that
is not given. Results of the requests for information from EU port and terminal managers
represent 5.52 % and from US port and terminal operator managers represent 10.8 %. In
general, total response rate for email surveys for industry surveys is found to be
approximately (in two different studies), 6 or 13.35 % (Tse et al 1995; Hamilton
2003). However, due to the fact that at least one response is received from all but one
EU country (Portugal) and all three US coasts and Hawaii and Alaska, we feel that there
is no non-response bias in the survey findings due to the representative geography of
ports and terminals that responded. Furthermore, since all types of ports must comply
with ISPS that have international traffic other port characteristics should be representa-
tive in the survey responses across countries, states and regions. However, there is no
New York port or terminal operator response—the center of the 9/11 incidents.
In order to ensure that the measurement across all respondents is consistent and
comparable, the validity and the reliability of the survey instrument must be addressed.
Validity refers to the ability of the question in a survey instrument to measure what it
purports to measure (Academic.Luzerne.Edu 2005). Reliability refers to the ability of
the question to provide consistent measures in comparable situations (Fowler 1993).
The type of validity applicable in the survey instrument here is content validity that
focuses on the content of the information being asked (Academic.Luzerne.edu 2005).
The survey instrument asks for some factual information from the respondent that can
be compared with the port or company Website. In order to increase the validity of the
instrument, we further have to make sure that the respondents understand the questions,
know the answer, and are willing to reveal their knowledge (Fowler 1993).
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In order to increase the validity, we took the following steps. The questions test on a
pilot sample of EU port and terminalmanagers andwe receive feedback as to thewording
of the questions, who should be asked based on whowas knowledgeable on thesematters
in each port organization and who would most likely share the knowledge. The findings
are confirmed with the respondents to ensure that we understand the information that is
shared. In reporting results, if a respondent answers that an assets/resource is unique or
specific it is categorized as Brare^ which is the resource-based strategic theory definition
noted. In developing the survey, the stakeholders and pilot sample respondents believe
that Brare^ could best captured if the construct was divided into the two categories.
It is because that no two ports are alike that port managers’ perceptions on their port
security resource mix may differ from port to port. Reliability is in the perception of what
is being measured not the resource itself. In order to ensure reliability, we ask each
respondent the same set of questions. A certified professional translator translates of the
instrument into French and Spanish. To ensure that the questions mean the same to every
respondent and that the appropriate type of response is communicated consistently to and
from all respondents, the stakeholders and the pilot sample members review the meaning
of each question. Finally, we review all responses and summarize them. The results show
that the respondents consistently reported the similar knowledge in the same manner.
Correlations such as Cronbach’s alpha can be used to confirm reliability and validity.
We calculate correlations across groups of the various respondents across the different
geography of the EU and USA to see if respondents answered similarly in relation to
the construct of Bno advantage or value.^ The construct of Bno advantage/value^ can be
viewed as the control variable. So, to confirm whether they is a consistency in
understanding the measures (validity) by respondents across ports (reliability) the
following correlations are calculated: First, correlations between BV^ valuable re-
sponses and no competitive advantage are calculated for US port authority managers,
US terminal managers, EU port authority managers, and EU terminal operators.
Second, correlations between BR^ rare and no competitive advantage are calculated
for the same groups. Third, correlations between BI^ inimitable and no competitive
advantage are calculated for the same groups. Finally, correlations between BN^ non-
substitutable and no competitive advantage are calculated for the same groups. These
correlations can show understanding of each of the constructs of the resource based
strategic theory and reliability across various ports by managers. For BV^ correlations
for US port authority, EU port authority and EU port terminal operators the correlations
are remarkably similar at −0.152, −152, and −0.15. For US terminal operators, the BV^
correlation is −0.61. For BR^ correlations for US port authority, EU port authority
managers, and EU terminal operators also show high similarity at −0.66, −0.66, and
−0.66 For US terminal operators the BR^ correlation is −0.73. For BI^ correlations for
US port authority, US terminal operators, EU port authority managers, and EU terminal
operators also show high correlations at −0.41, −0.4, −0.41, and −0.41. Finally, for N
correlations for US port authority, EU port authority, and EU port terminal operators,
the correlations are also similar at −0.19, −0.19, and −0.188. For US terminal operators,
the N correlation is −0.42. The similar correlations confirm validity and reliability in the
instrument. Since the US terminal operator correlations are similar on the I and
correlate in the same negative direction on the other factors, it appears that the
correlation difference in V, R, and N for US terminal operators is due to the response
differences and not to a lack of understanding (validity) or inconsistency (reliability).
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6 Results
We report the results of the perceptions of the port managers and terminal operators on
whether their mix of security resources adds business value. We are grateful to these
managers for providing their perception on highly sensitive security measures. Again,
note that New York ports do not respond, and since they were the source of the 9/11
attacks, we respect their non-response. We evaluate the total percentages of positive
responses in a given category of resources. No statistical manipulation is conducted on
the data so the answers represent exactly how the managers responded. We consider
any statistical manipulation of the data other than compilation of the total responds
would mask the intent of the respondents.
According to the resource based strategic theory as stated in section 2 above, a
resource, capability, or competency adds business value or competitive advantage if it
is valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. Resource-based strategic theory can
be used to provide a context for determining whether port operators perceive their stock
of resources and decisions on capabilities and competencies for port security make a
difference to the port’s business value. Table 1 indicates a summary of the responses. It is
separated into two parts: responses indicating the security asset type with no advantage
or value and responses indicating security asset type with advantage or value.
Furthermore, if an advantage/value is noted by respondents the type of advantage is
also indicated (V, R, I, N) with a B*^ in the table. Again, resources must have a B*^ to
indicate value/advantage under the theory. Red or italic numbers in the table indicate the
opposite of the column heading. This is done to compare how assets are perceived
between the USA and EU so red or italic numbers under the BEU No Advantage^
column indicate that EU port and terminal operators did find value under the B*^ noted
V, R, I, and N columns. Again, if a column does not have a B*,^ under the theory, the
resources does not meet VRIN, and therefore does not provide business value/advantage.
The results are as follows: For physical assets in US ports, a majority (from 57.14 to
92.86 %) of port and terminal operators find that these security assets do not provide
business value. For ongoing management resources deployed, again a majority (from
50 to 71.43 %) are not perceived as providing business value. Similarly, for planning
and structuring management resources, 50 to 66.67 % perceive no business value. The
same is true for security technology assets (58.33 to 81.82 %) and financial security
resources (76.92 to 83.33 %).
However, it is in intangible security assets that US port and terminal managers
perceive have business value. Port security capacity of the organization (75 %),
complementary security infrastructure or hinterland assets (61.54 %) of the organiza-
tion, the presence of safety and security culture (69.23 %), union participation in
security (53.85 %), and outreach relationships (76.92 %) are all considered valuable,
rare, inimitable, and not substitutable. Employee experience in security (53.85 %) is
valuable, rare, and not substitutable but not inimitable. This confirms that the way
assets are deployed and managed, in the case of US ports and terminals, through
intangible assets, is perceived to be most effective in providing business value using a
resource based strategic theory context.
Unlike US managers, EU port and terminal operators perceive that business value
can be gained in the deployment and management of physical structures (58.97 % or
(100–41.03 %)) and perimeter barriers (52.63 % or (100–47.37 %)). They are perceived
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Table 1 Port and terminal operators’ responses
Percentages
USA EU Indicated reason
No advantage No advantage V R I N
Physical resources
Structures 64.24 41.03 –* –* –* –*
Physical ad perimeter barriers 57.14 47.37 –* –* –* –*
Lighting 57.14 64.86




Anti-vehicle barricades 61.54 70.97
Uniforms 71.34 62.16
Ongoing management
Communication systems 50 53.85
Documentation and security reports 50 48.72 –* –* –* –*
Patrolling systems 50 55.26
Access systems 64.29 60.53
Cargo tracking systems 71.23 59.46
Security and access procedures 66.67 56.76
Security incentive systems 64.29 61.76
Warning and alarm systems 57.14 59.46
Checklists 50 56.76
Planning and structuring management
Security planning systems 50 53.85
Assessment systems 61.54 58.97
Dual usage asset plans 61.54 61.76
Brainstorming session systems 61.54 63.89
Security logistics design 66.67 60
Human assets
Employee knowledge 53.85 39.47 –* –* –* –*
Employee training 61.54 48.72 –* –* –* –*
Guard forces 84.62 52.94
Trained canine units 100 63.33
Drills 64.29 50
Exercises 61.54 48.72 –* –* –* –*
Technological assets
Biometrics 81.82 63.33
Software protection 58.33 42.42 –* –* –* –*
Electronic access control 66.67 45.71 –* –* –* –*
Electronic surveillance 58.33 45.71 –* –* –* –*
Electronic and automatic tracking 66.67 53.13
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as VRIN. However for ongoing management security resources only documentation
and security reports (51.28 % or (100–48.72 %)) possessing VRIN.
EU port and terminal managers do not perceive planning and structuring manage-
ment (from 53.85 to 63.89 %) security resources as enhancing business value. Neither
do port security financial assets (from 60 to 63.89 %). However, human security
resources of employee knowledge (60.53 % or (100–39.47 %)), training
(51.28 % or (100–48.72 %)), and exercise (51.28 % or (100–48.72 %)) are
perceived to provide the best business value. Human experience (61.54 %) is
perceived as valuable, rare and non-substitutable but not inimitable. Similarly,
security technological assets of software protection (57.58 % or (100–
42.42 %)), access control (54.29 % or (100–45.71 %)), and electronic surveil-
lance (54.29 % or (100–42.42 %)) provide business value for EU ports and
terminals.
Similar to US port and terminal managers, EU managers perceive that intangible
security assets are very important in providing business value to the organization.
Security capacity of the organization in the port (69.44 %), complementary security
infrastructure (63.89 %), safety culture (61.11 %), union (65.71 %), local fishermen
(55.88 %), and outreach (67.65 %) relationships, all are considered VRIN. Again
similar to the perception of US managers, this perception of EU port and terminal
managers confirms that the way assets are deployed and managed through intangible
assets is perceived to be the most effective way to gain business value using the
resource based strategic theory framework.
Table 1 (continued)
Percentages
USA EU Indicated reason
Enterprise resource planning system 75 56.25
Financial assets
Port security fees 83.33 63.89
Other revenue generation for security and safety 80 60.61
Cost savings from security compliance 76.92 60
Intangible assets
Third party security 58.33 64.71




Capacity 75 69.44 –* –* –* –*
Complementary infrastructure 61.54 63.89 –* –* –* –*
Safety culture 69.23 61.11 –* –* –* –*
Union relationships 53.85 65.71 –* –* –* –*
Outreach relationships 76.92 67.65 –* –* –* –*
Entries in italics indicate that EU actually perceives advantage. Entry in bold indicates EU only
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7 Conclusion
This paper adds to the maritime literature in two distinct ways. First, it sheds light on
how managers perceive compliance with regulation. The maritime industry is highly
regulated and having the freedom of the method of compliance, i.e., the way regulations
are deployed through resources, can impact managers’ perception of the regulations’
impact on business value. Second, we apply resource-based strategic theory as a
framework for evaluating port and terminal operators’ perceptions of value and advan-
tage. This theory, highly cited in the general management literature, can bring insight
into maritime business strategy. It is argued that no two ports are alike and that port
choice and port competitiveness are dependent upon many factors and differ across
ports. Using resource-based strategic theory, managers look at their own stock of
resources and evaluate value. Thus, we can look across many ports evaluating how
each port looks at the necessary evil of compliance.
Although each port is unique, ISPS applies to all ports in countries that adhere to the
IMO convention. The comparison of the EU and the US management perception of
business value may help understand the EU and US management focus on port security
strategy. It is clear that the security of ports is crucial to ensure the safety of the goods
and the economic welfare of the communities served by the ports. This study shows
that although Bgates, guards, gadgets and gizmos,^ are still important to maritime
security in ports and terminals, it is the intangible security assets and management of
those assets or the way regulation is implemented that can make the most difference in
perceived value. These perceptions can impact their future decisions on port strategy
planning and implementation.
Furthermore, research is needed to quantify cost-effectiveness of differing methods
of compliance with security regulations and the resulting legitimacy benefit on the
business value. Additionally, research is needed in maritime business on all value
derived from the legitimacy of the organization. Raised as an issue in this paper,
legitimacy can be gained through compliance with regulations, but it can be gained
in other ways. This paper can prompt a new lens for discussions of business value.
Appendix 1. Portion of the survey instrument
Q1 Why you should complete this survey
We are trying to determine if US ports can receive competitive advantage (business
value) from their methods and processes of security compliance with ISPS and US
regulation.
Benefits to you—This research should provide companies with information on the
management practices that help you beat your competition (or provide value) and make
better security compliance decisions. The knowledge gained will be freely shared with
you in final tabulator form. We will not reveal the nature of any individual response to
any outside source.
Why you—You are a manager in a US port.
Who we are—We are nonprofit university research professors from the World
Maritime University (Malmo, Sweden) and Texas A&M University at Galveston
(Galveston, Texas, USA).
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Time to complete—The time to complete is approximately 15 min. We know you
are busy and will appreciate your help with this voluntary survey.
When we refer to assets/resources, we mean only assets/resources acquired after 1
July 2004. When we refer to competitive advantage or competitiveness, we mean that
which makes your company perform at a higher level than others in your same industry
or market (or provide any business value).
1. Your title and company
2. Your port
The following questions 3 through 9 list security compliance assets/resources by
type. This list was obtained from the US Coast Guard’s best practices. Please check
each box that applies for each asset. The headings mean: Unique means the asset/
resource is unique from my competitors’ assets/resources Valuable means the asset/
resource is more valuable than my competitors’ assets/resources Not easily imitated
means the asset/resource is difficult for my competitors to imitate(replicate). Non sub-
means the asset/resource is not easily substituted by other resources (rather than exactly
imitated). Specific means the asset/resource is specific to my company and cannot be
easily acquired or used by my competitors. No competitive advantage means you have
the asset/resource but you are not sure it gives you a competitive advantage or business
value.
3. Physical Assets/Resources include the following, etc.:
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4. Ongoing management assets/resources include the following, etc.:
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